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STATEMENT OF CASE
1. NATUFE OF CASE
Unte Cheh, PhD, PE, (Cheh) appeals &om the Industrial Commission's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order denying him benefits and the Industrial Commission's Order
Denying Reconsideration.
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
After contacting twenty (20) attorneys who would not take his case Cheh located an
attorney in Idaho Falls who agreed to help him. This attorney "forgot" about the claim and Cheh
ultimately had to file a complaint and proceed to hearing on January 15, 2009, without legal
counsel. After the hearing, while inquiring about a crime victims' fund, he was referred to the
undersigned. Upon review the egregious nature of the problem became apparent to the
undersigned and a Motion to Stay Briefing Schedule, Reopen Hearing, and Permit Discovery (R
Vol VII, p. 1186) was filed along with affidavits of Cheh and his undersigned counsel. (R Vol.
VI, p. 1175). The Referee exhibiting unacceptable impatience and frustration with (the until then
unreprescnled) Cheh denied the motion by stating "Enough is enou@...(and) it would create
manifest injustice to Defendants to allow Claimant to undo everyone's work on this matter.. ." (R
Vol. VII, p. 1223). The Referee submitted Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Recommendation (see Additional Documents). The Commission entered its own Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. (R Vol. VII, p. 1275). Cheh filed a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking the Commission to reconsider and rule on the Referee's denial of the
Motion To Stay Briefing Schedule, Reopen the Hearing, and Permit Discovery. (R Vol. VII p.
1293). The Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration. This appeal followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cheh was employed by EG & G Idaho, Inc. (EG&G) from November 1976 to January
1978. (R Vol. VII, p. 1276). In the spring of 1977 he began to have dental problems, nausea,
vomiting, and pain with deteriorating eye sight. 13e called 911 in October 1977. His employer
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told him that he was sick and that he needed to see a psychiatrist. Hi. T. p. 13. Because of
perceived psychological issues and depression which Cheh attributed to his relative isolation in
Idaho Falls, he applied for other jobs. Hi. T. p. 14. 29-3 1. He continued w o r h g in the nuclear
energy field with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In 1986-87 he began to develop
lesions on his skin. The doctors couldn't tell him what was causing the lesions. They were just
treating his symptoms. Hr.T. p. 14.
Cheh ultimately filed a federal claim for radiation sickness because of his many years of
exposure to low radiation at Three Mile Island and 20 other operating reactors and storage sites
in the eastern United States. R. Vol. VI, p. 1181. This claim was denied by the Federal DOL. It
was determined that his illness and deteriorating condition was caused by "high dose" exposure
and not "low dose" exposure. He had never been told of, and he did not know of, a "high dose"
exposure(s) occurring at EG&G.
In January 2007, Cheh received a letter from the USW Worker Health Protection Program
which advised him of screening for radiation exposure. R Vol. VII, p. 1197. He was not been
previously told of, nor was he aware of, any exposure at EG&G. On January 16, 2007 Cheh
contacted the EG&G human resources to file a worker's compensation claim. On January 22,
2007 Cheh received a letter from Dr. Chiodo, M.D., that made him aware that his psychiatric
condition and his radiation disease were due to exposures at EG&G. R Vol. VII, p. 1199 that
were unreported. On January 23rdafter receiving no assistance from EG&G he filed a keedom of
information request. R Vol. VII, p. 1198; R Vol. VII, p. 1181-82. He never received any follow
up or assistance from EG&G. In March he attempted to obtain an attorney. After contacting
about 20, an Idaho Falls attorney agreed to represent him in June 2007. However, this attorney
advised Cheh that he had "forgotten" about his claim and told him that he wasn't going to
represent him any further. R Vol. VI, p. 1182.
It was not until after the hearing before the Referee on January 15, 2009, merely by
happenstance, that Cheh contacted an attorney that would even attempt to speak with him. Cheh
had been inquiring about a crime victim compensation fund that he had heard of and he was
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referred to the undersigned counsel (R Vol. VI, p. 1181). When he contacted the undersigned,
despite the language difficulties, the confusing documents, and the "black and white" thinking of
a nuclear scientist, the undersigned discussed, for hours, the facts of his situation, and reviewed
various documents. R Vol. VI, p. 1177. It was obvious that Cheh had difficulty communicating
because of his Korean ancestry and the complex nature of his illness. R Vol. VI, p. 1177. After
many hours of difficult and trying conversation with Cheh and reviewing the documents Cheh
provided, the undersigned submitted an affidavit to the Industrial Commission. It clearly states
that further testimony and evidence could be brought out after document production and review,
and depositions, that would clariSr the record. This would then allow the Commission to fairly
resolve the issues and that the Commission, based thereon, could reasonably conclude that the
notice requirements had been fully complied with by Cheh. R Vol. VI, p. 1177.
The record is replete with documentation of Cheh's poor mental and physical condition.'
Cheh could not even attend the hearing because of his illness. He was "home-bound with
colorectai paidbleeding requiring frequent urination about every 30 to 45 minutes and
waterlsoap enema every 3 to 4 hours to remove human waste, heart condition (left bundle branch
block), shortness of breath and deteriorating eyesight.. .and depression. I can neither aboard a
plane nor drive except a short distance to and from local drug stores, daily therapy and
supermarkets." R Vol IV, p. 577-78. Based on this information the Referee ordered that any
party could attend the hearing by telephone. R Vol. V, p. 774. Cheh did not attend and needed
help asking and understanding questions from a friend. The employer/surety's attorney attended
in person and called no witnesses. see J3r. T.
The Referee denied the motion to stay briefing, reopen the hearing, and permit discovery.
He submitted his proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusion, and Order to the Commission. It
entered its Order, based upon a convoluted record and minimal, and disjointed, testimony at
hearing, holding that Cheh failed to comply with Idaho Code 72-448. R Vol. VII, p. 12. The

'

For example, John V. Wylie, M.D. in a letter dated November 6,2001 discussing Cheh's condition stated that
"Unte Cheh has been under my psychiatric care since 1994. During this time, Dr. Cheh has suffered &om an
Adjustment Disorder with mixed anxiety and depression (309.28) and Post Tranmatic Stress Disorder, chronic
(309.81) manifested by preoccupation with and intrusive thoughts of his work place and intrusive thoughts
concomitant severe bowel dysfunction including frequent bowel movements and rectal bleeding in direct response to
work stress." R Vol. VII [sic] 120, actually 1201. As Dr. Chido states in hiis letter of January 22,2007, "Due to your
visual deterioration and psychiatric condition you are disabled and this disability is likely to be permanent." R Vol.
VII, p. [sic] 120, actually 1202.
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Commission then upon Cheh's Motion for Reconsideration bed the Referee's denial of his
Motion to Stay Briefing, Reopen the Hearing, and Permit Discovery. R Vol. VII, p. 1318.

STANDARDOF REVIEW
When reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, this Court exercises free review of the
Commission's legal conclusions, but will not disturb findings of fact if they are supported by
substantial and competent evidence. In reviewing a claimed abuse of discretion this Court
determines (1) whether the Commission correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the Commission acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the
Commission reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Medrano v. Neibaur, I36 Idaho 767,

40 P.3d 125 (2002)
The provisions of the workers' compensation law are to be liberally construed in favor of
the employee. Liberal construction in favor of the worker is required to enable the act to serve
the humane purposes for which it was promulgated. Jones v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 98 Idaho

458, 567 P. 2d 3 (1977); Hattenburg v. Blanlw, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P. 2d 829 (1977).
Discretion should be exercised in a manner that tends to promote the decision of the
controversy upon the merits. Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co., Inc., 74 Idaho 483, 264 P. 2d

466 (1953).
The primary purpose of proceedings before the Industrial Commission is the attainment of
justice in each individual case. The proceedings are to be conducted as far as possible in
accordance with the rules of equity. The overriding purpose of Commission proceedings is to do
justice in the given situation. The Commission is imbued with certain powers that specifically
enable it to enhance the likelihood of equitable and just results. Hagler v. Micron Technology,

I18 Idaho 596, 798 P.2d 55 (1990)
"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood or recognized at
once by the mind; not obscure; obvious. "Injustice" has been defined to mean: absence of justice;
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violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an unjust act or deed; wrong.

Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 527, 650 P. 2d 669 (1982).
Without specific findings to support the Industrial Commission's conclusion that manifest
injustice was not shown the Court can not review the issue adequately and must remand to the
Commission to review their decision and to make specific findings in order that this Court can
properly review the issue. Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 644 P. 2d 331 (1982); Banzhaf v.

Carnation Co. 104 Idaho 700, 662 P. 2d 1144 (1983)
The term "manifest injustice" as a ground for reopening must be construed broadly and
doubtful cases resolved in favor of the humane purposes of the workers' compensation act. Smith

v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P. 2d 404 (1946); Iverson v. Gordon Farming Co., Inc.,
103 Idaho 527, 650 P. 2d 669 (1982); Goodson v. L. W: Hult Produce Co., 97 Idaho 264, 543 P,
2d 167 (1975)
The process and procedure under workers' compensation law is to be in accordance with
the rules of equity. Idaho Code 72-708.
ISSUE
THE COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
BY NOT STAYJNG BRIEFING, NOT PERMITTING CHEH
TO UNDERTAKE DISCOVERY, AND NOT PERMITTING CHEH
TO REOPEN THE HEARING
Cheh, living in Maryland, unable to travel due to his disease, and with difficulty
communicating because of his Korean ancestry, through no fault of his own was unable to obtain
counsel to assist him in his occupational disease claim against EG&G until he obtained an
attorney who "forgot" his case. The problem with the attomey led to all sorts of mistrust on the
part of Cheh of the attomey in question, and ultimately distrust of Industrial Commission
personnel. R Vol. VII, p. 1288. As painfully documented in the record, Commission personnel
grew frustrated with him. Cheh was literally compelled to go to hearing, by telephone because he
couldn't travel due to his illness, without any legal assistance. It was only after seeking help,
regarding the crime victims fund, that the undersigned counsel was located and took the time to

try to communicate with him and review documents regarding his claim.

5

APPELLANT CHEH'S OPENING BRIEF

Promptly upon counsel's review, before any briefmg had been started, a Motion to Stay
Briefing Schedule, Reopen Hearing, and Permit Discovery was filed, accompanied by affidavits
and a Request for Production of Documents. R Vol. VI, p. 1176; R. Vol. VII, p. 1186; R. Vol.
VI, p. 1171. The potential for manifest injustice, if the Motion to Stay Briefing, Reopen the
Hearing, and Permit Discovery was not granted because of the total disarray of the record and
testimony was obvious to the undersigned counsel, who has argued workers compensation law
before this Court since Yeend v. United Parcel Service, 104 Idaho 333, 659 P. 2d 87 (1982). R
Vol. VI, p. 1177.
The Referee in an overt display of frustration denied the motion stating, "Enough is
enough." R Vol. VII, p. 1223. The Referee ignoring the clear record before the Commission that
documents Cheh's difficulties in fmding any attorney, and then fmding an uninterested counsel,
determined that Cheh had "for whatever reasons" tried to prosecute the case on his own. R Vol.
VII, p. 1224. The obvious reason, based on the record, is that Cheh wasn't given the time of day
by attorneys up until that time. Incredibly, the Referee and the Commission ruled in a manner
turns the public policy of the workers' compensation act upside down. Workers' compensation
matters are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee. Jones v. Morrison- Knudsen Co.,
98 Idaho 458, 567 P. 2d 3 (1977); Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 485, 567 P. 2d 829 (1977).
The Referee went so far, and the Commission concurred, as to determine that "it would create
manifest injustice to Defendants (the insurance company and its skilled attorney employees
whose main focus of work is workers' compensation law) to allow Claimant to undo everyone's
work on this matter.. ." R Vol. VII, p. 1224. "Everyone's (e.g. insurance company and it's
attorney) work being "undone" suddenly takes priority over considering the merits of seriously
ill workers, after a full and fair hearing with a clear record? Decisions should be based upon the
merits and doubtful situations resolved in favor of the humane purposes of the workers'
compensation act. Pauley v. Salmon River Lumber Co., Inc, 74 Idaho 483, 264 P. 2d 466 (1953);
Smith v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P. 2d 404 (1946); Iverson v. Gordon Farming
Co., Inc., 103 Idaho 527, 650 P. 2d 669 (1982); Goodson v. L. K Hult Produce Co., 97 Idaho
264, 543 P. 2d 167 (1975).
Considering what Cheh had at stake in this claim, considering his mental and physical
condition, considering that the employer/surety was represented by experienced legal counsel
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who is an employee of one of the largest, if not the largest, workers' compensation insurance
companies in the entire United States (R Vol. 11, p. 342), considering that an experienced counsel
in workers' compensation matters filed an affidavit that a clear presentation of evidence before
the Commission could likely result in a favorable decision to Cheh, the denial of the Motion was
not only questionable, it was unjust and an abuse of discretion. see Ball v. DA W Forest Products
Co., 136 Idaho 155, 30 P.3d 933 (2001). In this case, unlike Ball, the abusive d i g of the
Referee was considered on reconsideration and upheld by the Commission.
The term "manifest injustice" as a ground for reopening must be broadly construed and
doubtll cases resolved in favor of the humane purposes of the workers' compensation act. Smith
v. University of Idaho, 67 Idaho 22, 170 P. 2d 404 (1946); Iverson v. Gordon Fuming Co., Inc.,
103 Idaho 527, 650 P. 2d 669 (1982); Goodson v. L. W.Hult Produce Co., 97 Idaho 264, 543 P.
2d 167 (1975).
It is apparent from the ruling of the Referee and the ruling of the Commission that they
viewed the Motion as one of discretion. However, the denial of the Motion was outside even the
outer boundaries of discretion and not consistent with the legal standards to workers'
compensation matter. LC. 72-201. A cursory look through the seven volumes of record
consisting of 1,339 pages, the exhibits lodged separately with the Court, and the "Additional
Documents" also separately lodged with the Court, reveals an extraordinarily ill and struggling
claimant, with no legal help, floundering badly at every turn. Even experienced workers'
compensation lawyers have difficulty in the arena of occupational diseases. Faced with skilled
legal counsel in opposition to his efforts, on the best of days, Cheh had no chance to present his
case and prevail.
The Commission's Order denying reconsideration while certainly more polished reveals
disregard of the public policy and intent behind our workers' compensation act. It is
inconceivable how the employer/surety would be subject to "manifest injustice" by having to
defend a properly, and coherently, presented claim.
Yes, as the Referee notes, "Claimant had repeatedly filed inappropriate discovery and
motions." R Vol. VII, p. 13 18. Would anything other than "inappropriate discove~yand motions"
be expected of a person forced to proceed without an attorney in an area of practice and
procedure that only a handful of attorneys venture into, of a person who is unable to travel, of a
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person who has difficulty understanding and being understood, of a person who is extremely ill,
and of a person who is losing his eyesight?
The Commission despite the clear and undisputed record pertaining to Cheh's inability to
obtain any legal assistance, merely recited the Referee's comments and then, despite no evidence
contrary to that of Cheh's futile search for legal counsel (R Vol. VI, p. 1182) cryptically held that
Cheh had "ample time to retain counsel prior to the January 15, 2009 hearing." R Vol. VII, p.
1318. There are literally no required findings to support the Commission's conclusion Sines v.
Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 644 P. 2d331 (1982).

"Manifest" has been defined to mean: capable of being easily understood or recognized at
once by the mind; not obscure; obvious. "Injustice" has been defmed to mean: absence of justice,
violation of right or of the rights of another; iniquity, unfairness; an unjust act or deed; wrong.

Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 527, 650 P. 2d 669 (1982). The refusal of first the Referee and then the
Commission to permit the seriously ill and obviously confused Cheh, through counsel, to present
his case can be viewed as nothing but a manifest injustice.
Undersigned counsel recalls with admiration the longstanding actions of former
Commissions when confronted with manifest injustice. It w& not so long ago that Will
Defenbaugh, acting as a hearing officer, after the receipt of a full morning of testimony (far in
excess of what occurred in this case) cleared the room of all but the respective counsel and
informed those left, "We are going to forget that this morning occurred." He proceeded to
instruct counsel for claimant to either go learn workers' compensation law or to associate
counsel who already knew it. For those representing the defendants, he stated that he would
record their respective objections but that was the way it was going to be. Then the claimant had
counsel. Here Cheh, seriously ill and confused, was on his own. This was not because he wanted
to be, but rather because he had no other choice at that time. Has the concept and applicability of
equity changed so much over these few years that now the Commission is primarily concerned
about huge insurance companies and attorneys, with special expertise, at the expense of our
injured workers? The statute that provides for equity, LC. 72-708, hasn't been changed.
For the Commission, after such an utter miscarriage of justice, called a hearing, after it's
consideration of a complete jumbled mess of letters, medical records, and miscellaneous
documentation in the record, to refuse to permit Cheh shortly after the "hearing" and before
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briefing had even commenced, to Stay Briefing, Reopen the Hearing, and Permit Discovery
(after all of his extensive trying he had finally contacted an attorney willing to help him)
manifests an utter and complete failure to exercise appropriate discretion within the outer
boundaries of discretion and outside the legal standards applicable to injured workers claims
under the workers' compensation act. Indeed the Commission's Order denying Reconsideration
is devoid of the exercise of any reason on its part. R Vol. VII, p. 1318, 1319. Rather than
reflecting any consideration of the incredible hardships faced by Cheh in his lengthy and
unsuccessful prehearing search to obtain an attorney, his severe radiation illness, his failing eye
sight, his inability to travel, the total lack of any meaningful discovery of documents and records
from EG&G, his compromised mental condition, the Commission in nothing more than a
conclusory single sentence held "Claimant had sufficient time to prepare or find assistance in
preparing for hearing as he saw fit." The Commission's Order does not even reflect any
awareness or consideration of the contents of the undersigned's affidavit and Cheh's affidavit
submitted in support of the Motion to Stay the Briefing, Reopen the Hearing, and Permit
Discovery. There is literally no mention of the two affidavits. There is literally no discussion by
the Commission of the public policy of the workers' compensation act or the equitable powers of
the Commission. LC. 72-719 (c); 72-708. There is literally no discussion by the Commission of
the concepts of manifest injustice or equity. The Commission displayed, exercised, and
evidenced no reasoning in denying Cheh's Motion for Reconsideration of the Motion to Stay
Briefing, Reopen the Hearing, and Permit Discovery.

CONCLUSION
Cheh, was a nuclear scientist in the service of his adopted country. He was at the Three
Mile Island accident and he was there during it's restart. R Vol. VII, p. [sic] 120, 1202. He
contracted an insidious disease, in his service to our country, as the result of exposures to
radiation that went unreported by his employer. His failing health was shrugged off by his
employer as "psychological" problems and he was sent to see a psychiatrist. Cheh was never told
by his employer that he had been exposed to "high dose" radiation. When Cheh learned that he
had been subjected to unreported "high dose" radiation exposure at EG&G he immediately
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that on the 1 2 day
~ ~of April, 2010, a true and
correct copy of this Opening Brief of Appellant Cheh was mailed, with postage prepaid thereon
to:
E. SCOTT HARMON
Attorney at Law
Liberty Mutual Group
P.O. Box 6358
Boise, &IO
83707-6358
Starr Kelso
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